# AG Human Security

The Responsibility to Protect
Concealed Power-Politics or Principled Policy?

Robert Schütte/Johanne Kübler

Occasional Paper

ON THE AUTHORS:

Robert Schütte is student at the University of Cologne and also studied at the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). He is Associated Editor of the Human Security Journal published by the Centre for Peace and Human Security in Paris and an assistant fellow at the Human Security Research Unit. His academic focus lies on International Relations theory, Human Security, Legalization of International Relations and International Organisations.

Johanne Kübler is a student at the French-German Campus of the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). After having worked in Bangladesh, she is particularly focusing on the question how international institutions can help countries to develop and to regulate international conflicts peacefully. Her interests are in the area of International Relations theory, Human Security as a new approach in International Politics, and the European Union as an emerging international actor.

INPRINT

The Responsiblity to Protect
Concealed Power-Politics or Principled Policy?

Robert Schütte/Johanne Kübler

Occasional Paper
2/2007

The Working Group on Human Security
at the University of Marburg

AG Human Security
an der Philipps-Universität Marburg

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction

The controversy about military intervention with humanitarian purpose in the Kosovo crisis in 1999 was exemplary for the constant struggle between proponents of a "right to intervene" and defenders of the norm of non-intervention. The underlying struggle concerning the post Cold War "new world order", to use the well known words of George H. Bush in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, refers to a considerable part to the rules of a nowadays unipolar international system, in which the United States are the preponderant remaining superpower. The fall of the Soviet Union signified not only a caesura referring to the distribution of brute material capabilities, but also the normative imposition of a world wide liberal hegemony making human rights, democracy and market-economy the strived for model. However, being confronted with humanitarian catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and insufficient responses of the international community to stop these large-scale atrocities, the question of the future content and notion of sovereignty became salient. The task of how to react to such crises in a legitimate, appropriate and effective manner maintains to be disputed until now. Playing an import part in this discussion, the United Nations General Secretary Kofi Annan kept the topic on the agenda and repeatedly urged the international community to come to grips with the question of a response to "gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity" (Annan 2000: 48). Reacting to this appeal, the Canadian Government under Jean Chrétien announced at the General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The Commission's task was to treat the legal, moral, operational, and political dimensions of the issue in order to elaborate an adequate framework concerning the relationship between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention(s). The final report *The Responsibility to Protect* was eventually presented to the UN in December 2001, sparking a controversial debate on a world-wide scale.

The present paper aims to clarify the backdrop of the controversy as well as the question of how International Relations Theory can shed light on background and logic of support and opposition to the Responsibility to Protect. Therefore, the first part of the paper will explain the Canadian role in the discussion and give account to the content of the ICISS recommendations itself. The second part of the paper addresses the underlying logic of support and opposition by comparing the explanations of two paradigms in International Relations Theory: A Classical Realist argumentation concerned with po-

wer and power relations in the post Cold War international system, and a Constructivist perspective referring to norms, identities and socialization as explanatory independent variable.

1. The Responsibility to Protect Redefining the Sovereignty-Intervention Nexus in an Altered International Environment

1.1 The Good International Citizen: Canada as a Promoter of Human Security

The initiative taken by the Canadian government to create the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ties in with its historical engagement for global peace and the promotion of Human Security (Amouyel 2006). Already during the Cold War, Canada helped maintaining peace among the superpowers by intervening in critical situations such as the Suez crisis in 1956. On this occasion, the Canadian Under-Secretary for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson designed a plan to rectify the situation by replacing the French and British troops with a UN force, the first blue helmet troops in history (Girault et al. 2005: 389ff.). In 1957, Pearson received the Nobel Peace Price in recognition of his achievements in the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force; UNEF (Lowe 2000). Thereafter Canadian Governments have continuously contributed to peacekeeping missions, from a total of 65 peacekeeping operations Canada has contributed to 57 missions, often supplying a significant number of peacekeepers. "If there is any area of foreign and defence policy in which Canada did unquestionably make a difference, it is surely in the area of peacekeeping" (Granatstein 1992: 222). Since the binational initiative of Canada and Norway taken by its foreign ministers Lloyd Axworthy and Knut Vollebæk in May 1998, Canada has been one of the pioneers of the concept of Human Security[1] (Suhrke 1999). Seizing the opportunity of its presidency of the Security Council in February 1999, "Canada put the issue of 'human security' on the agenda in the form of a general discussion about transgressions against civilians during violent conflict" (DFAIT 1999). As its leitmotif, this innovative and controversially discussed new paradigm focuses on the safety of the individual, aims to enhance the security of people from both violent and non-violent threats (Millar 2006: 49),

---

1   The first use of the expression *human security* dates back to the 1995 foreign policy review "Canada in the World".

thereby extending the focus of security issues beyond traditional state-focused security concepts: "[F]rom a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments" (DFAIT 1999). The concept, commonly associated with the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, was thus remodelled as a policy instrument and integrated into Canada's foreign policy. In an article published in 1997, Axworthy called for the extension of security, arguing that the future concept should clearly go beyond military threats and should be people centred. More precisely, he stated that "Human Security […] includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life and a guarantee of fundamental human rights" (Axworthy 1997: 183-184). The effort to translate this concept into practical policy was initially characterised by the banning of anti-personnel landmines[2], the promotion of human rights, and in particular the protection of children. Furthermore, Canada, together with Norway, founded the Human Security Network which strives to unite like-minded states to promote the spread of the concept (Human Security Network 2001).

Canada's initiative for the formation of the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention with the purpose to elaborate clear guidelines for so-called "humanitarian interventions" has to be seen in this context. The ICISS was composed of twelve Commissioners of various countries and professions, "spanning between them an enormously diverse range of regional backgrounds, views and perspectives, and experiences," (ICISS 2001: 81) amongst them for example Gareth Evans of Australia and Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria. Since the launch of the final report, Canada has advanced the report's principles through UN reform efforts, other high-level diplomatic channels, research initiatives and outreach activities. In the following, the report elaborated by the ICISS and after that presented to the General Assembly in 2001 will be depicted and analysed. A particular emphasis is laid on the aimed redefinition of humanitarian intervention to a "Responsibility to Protect" as well as the concrete guidelines for future decision-making authority concerning the issue of intervention.

---

2   Canada signed the 1997 Ottawa Convention, a treaty that bans anti-personnel landmines. The Canadian Government created a \$100 million Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) to help universalize the Convention and achieve its humanitarian objectives. The Fund has constantly been renewed, providing another \$72 million over the next five years (2003-2008). Cf.: >http://www.mines.gc.ca/IV/menu-en.asp<, 17.07.2007.

1.2   In Need for a New Notion of Sovereignty? Examining the Responsibility to Protect

The end of the Cold War resulted on the one hand in a tendency of increased democratisation and the promotion of human rights, on the other hand it translated also into local and intrastate conflicts, often motivated by the capture of valuable resources and plunder (ICISS 2001: 4). Internal conflicts are becoming the predominant form of warfare thereby outnumbering the number of interstate wars, even if the distinction between intra- and interstate wars becomes increasingly blurred (Bailes 2005). The risk of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the general availability of light arms have increased the vulnerability of civilians, sometimes deliberately targeted by state and non-state actors. While these conflicts are often seen as "a set of discrete and unrelated crises occurring in distant and unimportant regions" (ICISS 2001: 5) of the world, they implicate refugee flows, export of drugs, spread of infectious disease, organised crime and globally interconnected terrorism. The international community is confronted with the problem of failed and weak states constituting a serious risk to the security of their own citizens and therefore to global peace in general, too. In this context, the regulation of conflicts and the task of state-building involves not only traditional actors like governments and bureaucracies but also new actors like local and global NGOs, manifold international organizations, and ad hoc tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or its sister tribunals for Rwanda and Sierra Leone. These non-state actors, for example Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, gain increasing importance and influence the debate about interventions[3] for human protection through their expertise, dissemination of information and agenda setting. In this altered context, the Commission states that there is a need for a revised definition of the prerogatives and duties of the state in the international community.

The tension between humanitarian interventions and the norm of non-intervention as a part of the notion of state sovereignty constitutes a political dilemma for the international community. However, the question is on the political agenda and is still not appropriately solved. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute con-

---

3   The Commission notes that the term "intervention" can be used to refer not only to military intervention but also to other coercive measures such as sanctions and criminal prosecutions of individuals (p. 8). In addition, the Commission deliberately refrains from using the term "humanitarian intervention" with regard to humanitarian groups objecting to the use of that expression in any situation where military action is being employed (p. 9).

cludes: "As the reasons and excuses for intervening multiply, the world needs more than ever an international authority and code to govern such actions, and a better system to create and deploy the optimum mixture of resources, including non-state actors, for them" (Bailes 2005: 5). It is for this purpose that the Commission aims to reconcile interventions for human protection and state sovereignty. Despite several polemics and reproaches, the Commission recognizes expressively the value of sovereignty, being often perceived by weak states as their "only line of defence" (ICISS 2001: 7) by guaranteeing their legal equality under international law and Article 2.1 of the UN Charter. However, the ICISS also affirms that sovereignty does not include any state's claim for "unlimited power [...] to do what it wants to its own people" (Ibid., p. 8). Instead, "sovereignty implies a double responsibility: externally - to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally - to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state" (Ibid.). With this statement the ICISS follows a proposition already outlined by Deng (1995). The external responsibility corresponds to the norm of non-intervention as determined in Article 2.1 of the UN Charter. Nowadays though, security challenges do result increasingly from warfare conduct in internal conflicts, partly aiming deliberately at the intimidation of civilians. It is for this reason that the Secretary General of the UN addressed the question of the two notions of sovereignty, the first vesting in the state, the second in the people and in individuals.[4]

From a legal point of view all members of the United Nations do acknowledge their responsibility toward the international community and toward their own people. Over the years, succeeding Human Rights Declarations have marked a remarkable codification of individual and social rights, leading thereby to an increasing national and international accountability of national executives.[5] Given this

---

4   Kofi Annan reaffirmed this vision at the launch of the Commission's report on February 15, 2002: "I sought to develop the idea of two notions of sovereignty: one for States, another for individuals. This idea was rooted firmly in the UN Charter, which affirms the sovereignty of States even as it challenges us to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war (…). How to protect individual lives while maintaining and even strengthening the sovereignty of States has become clearer with the publication of this report. You are taking away the last excuses of the international community for doing nothing when doing something can save lives."

5   Article 1.3 of the founding Charter of 1945, committed the UN to the "promotion and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion". It is noteworthy that the United States took at the start only a half-hearted effort to introduce and anchor human rights in the UN Charter. Only after the massive lobbying of NGOs Washington changed its stance significantly in order to lift

context of an increasingly elaborate framework for the protection of individuals, the Commission proposes the revision of the traditional non-intervention norm to a Responsibility to Protect obliging every state to protect its citizens from harm. This is nothing less than a substantial change in the understanding of sovereignty. The ICISS puts forward that intervention for human protection purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases, "is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator" (ICISS 2001: 16). However, such action is bound to two criteria of which at least one has to be met.

1. Large scale loss of life: The first criterion is defined as the threat or occurrence of actual or apprehend large scale loss of life. It does not matter whether this is the product either of deliberate state action, state neglect or a states inability to act. This criterion includes actions defined by the framework of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

2. Ethnic cleansing: The second criteria comprises actual or apprehended large scale ethnic cleansing, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape (Ibid., p. 32).

In order to justify a military intervention, crimes have necessarily to be of a "large scale". Moreover, given the availability of clear evidence suggesting a likely large scale killing in the nearest future, the ICISS advocates a military intervention as an anticipatory measure. The criteria do no differentiate between state actions and situations where the state in question fails to act. This non distinction is due to the fact that the Commission concentrates on the practical objective to protect civilians, emphasizing that it is irrelevant who factually endangers human beings.

However, the Commission also names situations that must not justify military intervention in order to limit the discretion of states willing to take action. These situations include violations of human rights falling short of large scale killing or ethnic cleansing such as systematic racial discrimination or repression of political opponents. Furthermore, it includes cases where a population is denied democratic rights. These situations may be answered by sanctions, but military intervention should be reserved to situations fitting at least one of the above mentioned criteria. Explicating the sort of situation in-

---

human rights aspects onto the international Agenda. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the two Covenants of 1966 reaffirmed these principles. The establishment of the International Criminal Court is also an outgrow of this development.

admissible to coercive military action by the international community or ad hoc coalitions indicates the ICISS's desire to exclude the possibility of intentional political misuse of their propositions.

The Responsibility to Protect signifies the supply of life-supporting protection and assistance to populations at risk and consequently does not end with a Responsibility to React to humanitarian crisis, but also implies a Responsibility to Prevent beforehand as well as a Responsibility to Rebuild in the aftermath of an intervention (ICISS 2001: 17). Prevention may include precautionary measures, development assistance to address root causes of conflicts, support for local initiatives to advance good governance, human rights and the rule of law, but also the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation. Direct reactive measures to humanitarian catastrophes comprise increased pressure on regimes unwilling to support their population (Ibid., pp. 29-37) including sanctions, embargoes, and only in extreme cases, military intervention. The report states clearly how to define this situation: "When all order within a state has broken down or when civil conflict and repression are so violent that civilians are threatened with massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a large scale" (Ibid., p. 31) Military intervention should be limited to exceptional cases, only be applied as a matter of last resort and there must be reasonable prospects to stand a chance of success. However, this *ultima ratio* criterion is ambiguous in content: It is practically impossible to detect objectively whether there remains a chance for a non-military solution to a crisis. Rather than constituting an objective threshold, the criterion lies within an essentially political realm. The same argument matches the question of a prospect to stand a chance of success. Even though the war in Iraq in 2003 was in no way a humanitarian intervention, the case illustrates clearly the impossibility to judge a priori whether there is a real chance for success or at least improvement in the aftermath of violent intervention. The failed intervention in Somalia in 1993 also illustrates the same kind of pitfalls an intervening power risks to entrap itself.

In order to avoid a narrow focus of security, the Commission adds to its definition of risk also the category of environmental catastrophes. Even if the Responsibility to Protect lies first and foremost with the state concerned, the international community may be forced to help when a state is not capable to deal with difficulties on its own. In total, efforts made to address root causes of conflicts should increase the credibility for broader international humanitarian action. Referring to the responsibility to rebuild, it is urged that all post-conflict plans need to include basic security and protection for all members of a population, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of local security forces, the rebuilding of new national

armed forces, police and national reconciliation. Furthermore there has to be an exit strategy for intervening troops. The rebuilding efforts need to be aimed at enabling the concerned state to regain its *de facto* sovereignty.

1.3 Who does What? The Question of Authority in Situations Acute Human Distress

After having clarified above the most important reflections of the Responsibility to Protect, the question remains to be resolved which institution may be vested with the authority to react to an untamable humanitarian crisis. First, it has to be noted that in a situation potentially necessitating an intervention, the Responsibility to Protect lies first and foremost with the prevailing state. If the legal authority is not able to react appropriately in order to halt a situation gravely endangering its people, the international community comes into question. It is important to determinate the threshold and process of the transfer of authority in a situation characterized by such a lack of a national authority willing or able to guarantee the security of its people. The ICISS names legitimacy, authority, operational effectiveness, and political will as the crucial preconditions for the success of intervention. Albeit the often disillusioning experiences of the past, the UN is designated as the paramount body for international security governance. Collective intervention blessed by the UN is commonly regarded as legitimate because it is duly authorized by the international community, endorsing thereby a "collective legitimacy" (Ibid., p. 48).

Following the report, the United Nations Charter provides sufficient legal capabilities to UN organs to deal with humanitarian crises. In fact, the UN Charter underlines the non-intervention principle and prohibits the United Nations from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". However, the Security Council remains, following Article 24 of the UN Charter, the primary responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, who takes action if it "determine[s] the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression", citing article 39. By the means of the UN Charter, the Security Council is thus allowed to resort to or permit the use of military force if other low intensity measures such as sanctions and embargoes are inadequate. In the Commission's point of view, the cited articles as well as Chapter VII of the UN Charter are the only ones to trump the domestic jurisdiction restriction. They enable the United Nations to "deal with the whole spectrum of peace, security and human protec-

tion issues" (Ibid.). Hence, despite the fact that there are many reasons for being dissatisfied with the role the Security Council played so far, it remains the principal and most important institution vested with global security issues. Apart of and in order to avoid a proposal for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, the Commission has rather chosen to propose a "code of conduct" for the use of the veto concerning actions that are needed to avert significant humanitarian crisis (Ibid., p. 51). This conduct of the ICISS points to a pragmatic approach to the question, aiming at a proposition being as most applicable as possible. Hence, the Commission demands the permanent members of the Security Council to keep at bay their veto-power by dint of using it only in cases being directly tangential to their national interest. However, it remains doubtable, whether the application of a practice following the logic of "naming, blaming and shaming" would prove efficient in cases of obvious obstruction.

In general, all proposals for military intervention necessarily have to be brought before the Security Council, according to the Charter's principle of the prohibition on the use of force. However and with respect to the recent past, when it comes to the question of authorizing military coercive action, the Commission identified one major dilemma: Given the case that there are gross violations of human rights in some region of the world, which do clearly qualify as an ethnic cleansing. The legal authority of the state is unwilling to rectify the situation, being itself complicit in the atrocities and referring to it as a purely domestic question. The Security Council concerns itself with this situation, but defects because of discordance among the veto powers on the question how to react to the situation. As a consequence, the international community, an ad hoc coalition or a regional organization face the following dilemma: either they obey international law, thereby standing idly by to mass atrocities, or they choose to intervene militarily, thereby violating international law? Whereas the first position would be legal but disastrous in its consequences, the second choice would be "not legal but legitimate", as Kofi Annan put it with reference to NATO's intervention in Kosovo.[6] Referring to this dilemma, the Commission formulates two messages to the Security Council: if it fails to authorize collective intervention, suchlike coercive measures by ad hoc coalitions or individual states will intensify. The ICISS underlines that without the discipline and constraints of UN authorization, an intervention may not be conducted for the right cause or with the right commitment.

---

6   The question of the legitimacy of selective humanitarian intervention deserves research on its own, which can however not be made on this occasion. For a discussion of that point cf. Chevallier (2005 : 138f.).

However, given that an intervention would be successfully accomplished, this would necessarily undermine the authority of the Security Council, its permanent members, and finally subvert the credibility of the United Nations (ICISS 2001: 75).

Although the ICISS observed during their conferences that ad hoc coalitions acting without the approval of the Security Council or the General Assembly did not find wide favor, one has to read between the lines of the argument: There is neither a sort of condemnation nor an explicit propagation of intervention in cases of Security Councils defection. The references to the question are rather indirect and of a convoluted manner. Stressing that the aim of the Commission was to reconcile state sovereignty and the capacity of the international community to react to humanitarian crisis, the ICISS states that it is "unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern" (Ibid., p. 51). Given this case, the very term of "international community" would become a "travesty" (Ibid., p. 75). Supporting this argument, it is furthermore reasonable to interpret the absence of a prohibition of extra legal humanitarian interventions as an implicit assent to the already existing practice. Reading the wording of the Synopsis part 3-F, that "(…) in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation", indicates approval to such illegal but legitimate action. Above all, the expressions "situation crying out for action" as well as "meeting the gravity and urgency of that situation" show clearly that the ICISS considers an intervention as a necessary and lesser evil. Another case in point is the linguistic turn from the principally normative argumentation throughout the report to an utilitarian one, implying that no normative reason can be evoked to a dismissal of international law. In contrary, it should be the common interest of all permanent members to avoid such a blockage in order to maintain their proper margin of manoeuvre. The Commission's avoidance to explicitly support the practice of extra legal interventions seems to be comprehensible given the fact that the ICISS neither wants to promote or to be held hostage by governments conducting illegal warfare under the label of humanitarian considerations – the rhetoric of Bush and Blair during the war in Iraq 2003 being a point in case – nor wants to offer an easy target for polemics. There is good reason to believe in a tacit consensus among the Commission in favour of extra legal humanitarian interventions as an absolute last resort measure due to the factual systemic deficiency of the Security Council's decision-making process.

2. The Responsibility to Protect and International Relations Theory: Realist and Constructivist Interpretation

2.1 The Responsibility to Protect: Power Politics or Moral Imperative?

The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty analyzed above has sparked remarkable resistance throughout the developing world and especially the G-77. The main reproach to the Responsibility to Protect as to any infraction of sovereignty is that it means nothing but "another attempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions on non-Western societies" (Mack 2002) through a successive erosion of the norm of non-intervention, which is regarded as the maybe best and last line of defence of the weak. This argument is not at all surprising: Even Alexander Hamilton noticed the equalizing effects of sovereignty, being advantageous above all to weak states while disadvantaging the powerful ones in the international system (Stourzh 1970: 134). Given this context, the G-77 stated clearly their rejection of "the so-called "right" of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law" (Group of 77). However, there is an increasing questioning and redefinition of sovereignty since the end of the Cold War by western international legal experts (Byers/ Chesterman 2003: 190) not only crystallizing in the conduct of several humanitarian interventions[7] but also in the categorization of some states as "failed states", "weak states" or "rogue states", this way refusing them their equal status as members of the international community (Roberts 2005: 55). Even though the issue of the changing notion of sovereignty is on the agenda since the end of the Cold War, the governments constructing the United Nations in the aftermath of World War II were fully aware of the potentially challenging implications of international human rights legislations for their domestic policy autonomy (Sikkink 1993: 141). The ensuing question that comes to struck International Relations theorists is therefore twofold: What is the logic behind the opposition and support of the concept of sovereignty, that is to question the motive of changing the comprehension of sovereignty, being promoted by the ICISS? Secondly, what kind of event has triggered the demise of the non-intervention norm on grounds of humanitarian considerations, and how can this be comprehended? Classical Realism, most cogently elaborated by Edward

---

7   For example in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo or East Timor.

Hallett Carr, and the Constructivist paradigm increasingly gaining leverage which, approaches this question from two different standpoints. Using a Kantian expression of the relationship between ethics and politics (Kant 1975), Classical Realism asserts that states are above all *political moralists* utilizing moral arguments, consciously or unconsciously, in order to legitimize their selfish interests. "Politics are not (…) a function of ethics, but ethics of politics" (Carr 2001. 62). On the contrary, Constructivists maintain that the basis of interest is constituted ideationally by norms, identities and socialization (Wendt 1999), including among other things ethical values shaping the perception of the outer world. In order to answer the question whether the Responsibility to Protect is rather a form of concealed power politics or a serious moral imperative, the paper will in the following discuss the different positions supporting or rejecting the propositions of the ICISS report with the aid of the two paradigms mentioned above.

2.2 A Realist Interpretation: The Responsibility to Protect as Concealed Power-Politics

As the intellectual father of Classical Realism, E. H. Carr formulated a famous and equally devastating critic of "idealist" politics pursuit during the interwar period. The *Twenty Years Crisis* was published in 1939, but despite its age remains a precious source for a Realist comprehension of the present quarrel between proponents and opponents of an asserted Responsibility to Protect. As an essential part of the theory's positive heuristic, that is the irrefutable "hard core" (Lakatos 1970: 133-138), functions the statement that ethics are a function of politics. Hence, ethical values are not independent from politics but rather derive, tacitly or explicitly, from a certain configuration of interests among social agents. "The realist has thus been enabled to demonstrate that the intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism (…) (are) both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance of interest" (Carr 2001: 65). Ethical values reflect thus nothing but certain interests of agents in the international system.

Can this claim be made for Human Security in general as for the Responsibility to Protect in particular? The reproach of an imposition of western liberal norms, being generally binding for all members of the international system, fits into this scheme and is moreover supported by another mechanism explained by Carr: "Theories of social morality are always the product of a dominant group which identifies itself with the community as a whole, and which possesses facili-

ties denied to subordinated groups or individuals for imposing its own view of life on the community. Theories of international morality are, for the same reasons and in virtue of the same process, the product of dominant nations or groups of nations" (Ibid., p. 74). It should be noted that this point of view reflects to a considerable degree the influence of Marxist theory on Carr. Drawing on this perspective, a Classical Realist would state that the western nations constitute in their ensemble a dominant group attempting to maintain their hegemonic worldview, to use this Gramscian term, and secondly try to pass this worldview to be of indisputably common interest. This analysis is among other things factually exemplified by statement of the ICISS report that there can be "exceptional circumstances in which the very interest that all states have in maintaining a stable international order requires them to react [*with coercive military action across borders*]" (ICISS 2001: 31), a statement at least seemingly incompatible with the position of the G-77 concerning humanitarian interventionism.

What still remains to be answered is the *cui bono*: why should western nations, following a Classical Realist argumentation, have an interest in the promotion of the Responsibility to Protect where as the greatest part of developing countries refuses such a redefinition of sovereignty? The Realist explication is clear: Sovereignty constitutes an impediment to international power politics by constituting its subjects as equal members (cf. Hart 1971) of the international community. The principle of non-intervention, laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, obliges all states to abstain from intervention and interfering in the domestic affairs of other states, thereby rendering pointless any asymmetries of power in international relations, at least theoretically. The rights and obligations attached to sovereignty apply with different power-distributional effects to the members of the international system: In fact, strong states are barely in need for the granted rights connected with sovereignty, because they are, thanks to their superior capabilities, able to guarantee these privileges for themselves. At the same time, they suffer under the obligations of sovereignty, that is the respect for the sovereign rights of other members of the international system. For strong states, the sovereignty norm is an uneven and disadvantageous trade-off with weaker states, which do profit extensively while giving little. From the perspective of a weak state, sovereignty offers much while demanding little. The principle of non-intervention is rather a protection against the interference of stronger states in ones proper affairs than an impediment to selfish intervention in other states affairs for which one misses the necessary capabilities anyway. Hence, under a power-distributional point of view it can be established that there is a

negative correlation between state power and utility of sovereignty, being the more advantageous the less power one poses. Cooper clarifies this point straight forwardly stressing that "attachment to treaties, the rule of law and multilateralism comes from weakness and wishful thinking. Rules exist to protect the weak" (Cooper 2003: 155; see also Kagan 2003, ch. 2).

It is not at all surprising that the developing countries cling to sovereignty condemning any attempt to riddle the principle of non-intervention. The Responsibility to Protect risks, in their view, to be the beginning of the end of sovereignty. The other way round, following a Classical Realist argumentation, invoking humanitarian concerns as the primary source for the Responsibility to Protect, the West attempts to exploit its preponderant position in the international system by the imposition of its proper liberal values benefiting his interest and consolidating his own hegemonic status. Hence, the Human Security doctrine in general and the Responsibility to Protect in particular are nothing but means to morally conceal the furtherance of narrow interests of the West. In brief: They are nothing but functions of a western predominance in the international system, a situation comparable to the period after 1918: The abrogation of the classical *ius ad bellum*, formerly a cornerstone of classical international law, as well as the interdiction of annexations, have to be seen as the morally disguised attempt of the victors of World War 1 to preserve an advantageous status quo, following Carr. Uncovering the fact that moral politics are effectively guided by selfish national interests, Classical Realism establishes a position of normative indifference towards international politics, being neither good nor bad. This ethical indifference, most clearly expressed by Carr's statement that "What was, is right. History can not be judged except by historical standards" (Carr 2001: 64f.), was strongly criticised by his fellow colleagues, referring to T*he Twenty Years Crisis* as being "completely mischievous" and "a piece of sophisticated moral nihilism", while naming him one of "Hitler's intellectual allies in Britain" (Angell 1940). Adopting a Classical Realist notion on the issue of a Responsibility to Protect means that no matter what moral argument is put forward, it has to be regarded as an epiphenomenal derivate of power-political interest. Thus, norms and morality can not be considered admissible for an explication of the underlying logic and motivations of the undergoing change of the notion of sovereignty. Explaining state preferences for or against the Responsibility to Protect means analysing the power relations of the international system.

What still remains to be answered is the question why this challenge to the classical understanding of sovereignty was so straightforwardly conducted after the end of Cold War. A Classical Realist

position being concerned with security and power-relation in the international system cites the end of the Cold War as the paramount trigger for this evolution. A striking example for this phenomenon is the implementation of humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone at the beginnings of the 1990s, all being conducted without exception by western states. There is simply no more constraint to the dominance of the United States as the only remaining super-power trying to consolidate its "unipolar moment" (Krauthammer 1991) into a world kept "off-balance" (Walt 2002), being supported by its bandwagoning allies in Europe and East-Asia. The fall of the Soviet Union marked thus a window of opportunity for the sole superpower, enabling it not only to equate its own interest with those of the whole system but also to promote it in a yet unimaginably forceful manner. Condoleezza Rice brings it to the point by stating that "American values are universal", comprising above all "freedom, markets, and peace" (Rice 2000). This position is congruent with the above examined Classical Realist argumentation. The existence of the non-intervention norm, codified in the UN Charter is in this view not only a cumbersome obstacle to the imposition of the economic and security interest of the United States, but above all a potentially rectifiable hurdle. For the reasons examined above concerning the power-distributional effects of sovereignty, it is in line with a Realist argument to assume that the preponderant power will press for a revision of the ordinary notion of sovereignty as soon as there is an adequate occasion. With the fall of the Berlin wall, the required window of opportunity appeared and set off such an evolution. Given this background, Carr might argue that the United States actively try to disperse the norm of sovereignty because it does not solve anymore the interest of the dominating power, that is, the interest of the White House. Using a discourse referring to "humanitarian interventions" in cases of gross violations of human rights, or promoting concepts like "rogue states", "weak states", or "failed states", is in this sense nothing but concealed power politics aiming at an erosion of sovereignty. Only the breakdown of the Soviet Union made the realization of this objective possible and desirable. The current dynamic finding its starting point after the end of the Cold War is though neither surprising nor irrational from a Classical Realist viewpoint.

2.3   A Constructivist Interpretation: The Responsibility to Protect as an Expression of Liberal Values

Addressing the dispute between Realism and Constructivism, one of the underlying ontological differences of the two paradigms is

the issue of interest formation in international relations (Schütte/ Fordelone 2006). Carr states clearly that ethics are a function of politics, the latter being above all directed by the furtherance of the prevailing national interest. Normative considerations are though seen as a dependent variable exercising no or at most a marginal influence on the formation of interest[8], but being rather the derivate of an exogenously determinable interest. In Realism "the explanatory role falls to the changing factor of the external environment in which the state tries to maximize its interest in a rational-choice manner" (Schütte/ Fordelone 2006: 37). This view is above all due to the methodological and ontological hegemony of rationalist thought, resulting in the viewpoint that "ideas are unimportant or epiphenomenal either because agents correctly anticipate the results of their actions or because some selective process ensures that only agents who behave as if they were rational succeed" (Goldstein/ Keohane 1993: 4). On the contrary, Constructivism stresses the endogenous characteristics of agency like socialization, norms and identity, this way granting a constitutive role to ideational qualities for the formation of interest. The difference is decisive: Ideational attributes can change in virtue of processes and interactions, thereby constituting dynamically new identities and evaluations of the social environment. Ethics do play a considerable role in this setting, because they deliver certain categories of perception, a normative framework for the interpretation of the outer world and a standard what kind of matters has to be considered right or wrong. The question, who can be regarded as "threatening enemy" or "trustworthy friend", and who belongs to an in-group or is seen as an outsider, remains a fundamentally ideational issue being among other things influenced by ethical considerations. Wendt is right stating that "the power of the USA has a different meaning to Canada than to Cuba". Normative and cultural concordance promotes identification and facilitates in this way cooperation between states, a fact supported by the comparatively high coherence of the community of democracies and, above all, the factual solidarity and closeness of the member states of the European Union. In spite of all the conflicts between the USA, EU and Japan, it can undoubtedly be stated that war as a form of conflict regulation among those countries is today as unthinkable as impossible due to the close identification with each other. As Risse correctly points out, these states constitute a genuine security community of liberal de-

---

8   It should be stated that Carr is however one of the less rigid realist authors, granting perception and ideas a certain but however subordinate role in the formation of interest. It is anyhow a characteristic of the (neo-)realist research program to consider that interests are fundamentally exogenously constituted, stemming from constraints and incentives in the environment.

mocracies (Risse 2002: 269-276) which do identify themselves with each other, a fact clearly situated by the direct reactions of political elites in the West after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 ranging from Schröder's "unlimited solidarity" to the statement "Today we are all Americans"[9]. This form of identification with one another signifies a condition under which a threat to the security or vital interest of a state belonging to a certain community is perceived as a threat to the interest of all the states of this community. The possibility of a German invasion of Luxembourg is above all ruled out by the fact that this would be a factually unimaginable action against a member of one's own in-group being totally incoherent with Germany's self-image and role conception. A rational calculus concerning costs and benefits of such a step or the consideration of economic interdependencies would – if at all – be a negligible factor. It is for this that there is no opposition between ideas and interests, because ideas shape to a substantial degree the very *gestalt* of interest. Constructivism, focussing on such ideational attributes of states like norms, socialization and identity, helps a big deal in explaining the formation of state interests, and in this way the behaviour of states. Contrary to Realist claims, Constructivist maintain that ideational factors shape the definition of what has to be regarded as interest, stating thereby that international politics can best be explained as a function of ideas. This is however far from reversing the Realist claim that "ethics are a function of politics" to an idealistic one stating "politics are the function of ethics", but rather reserving to ethics a certain influence on the interest formation of states. In fact, the formation of interest is a function of fundamental exogenous factors as well as endogenous ideational variables, or to put it differently between material and ideational interests. The exogenous factors set effective borderlines for the pursuit of interest, binding thereby every agent in the system. The endogenous ideational components define interests through norms, identity and socialisation, being themselves influenced by ethical doctrines. It may be though consensual that all states are bound by the necessity of their own survival and security. However, national interests themselves are shaped by ideational attributes of agency as well as their social context, and can not be regarded as the function of exogenous patterns. Ideas give in this sense content to security by defining its particular conception: Security of the narrow nation state? The members of an Alliance? A particular community of states? Or even all human beings like in the concept of Human Security? It is a hollow phrase to say that all states seek to

---

9   Headline of the French newspaper „Le monde" (« Aujourd'hui nous sommes tous américains »), 12. 9.2001.

promote their interest or to guarantee their security, as long as the concept and content of these terms rests woolly.

As already pointed out, ethical values in particular and ideas in general function as devices ordering, filtering, categorizing and evaluating the outer world while at the same time establishing normative standards for adequate behaviour in particular and society in general. This way, ethics do exercise an influence on state interest on the one hand by shaping identity and norms of agency, on the other hand influencing the perception and evaluation of other states, institutions and structures of the international system (Gelb/ Rosenthal 2003). It should be noted that drawing on the role of ethics in international relations does explicitly not mean to refer to the prevailing contents of ethical doctrines. Whatever ethics may contain as particular values, they do in any case make statements about the nature of "good" and "right" (cf. Rawls 1979), and exactly this fact is addressed here. They contribute to the identity of an agent, its role, and *raison d'État* in a social context. Stressing the usefulness of such an argument, Finnemore and Sikkink state that "empirical research documents (…) show how people's ideas about what is good and what 'should be' in the world become translated into political reality" (Finnemore/ Sikkink 1998: 916).

What can a Constructivist perspective then tell us about the Responsibility to Protect? Firstly, one can state that the ethical foundations underlying the arguments in favour of such a Responsibility to Protect towards all human beings are increasingly shaping the national interests of a great number of states in the West since the end of the Cold War. "The emergence of human rights policy is not a simple victory of ideas over interests. Rather, it demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape understandings of national interest" (Sikkink 1993: 140). Hence, this is a refusal of the Realist argument that ethics are nothing but a function of politics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the battleground for human rights has expanded significantly comprising the whole globe today. These normative considerations are, however, not the only factors influencing the policy making of the Western states, leading to an often ambiguous or even hypocritical policy conduct. Especially the proclaimed "war on terror" since the attacks of 9/11 have led to manifold contradictions between the protection and dissemination of human rights and the objective to arrest and fight terrorists, and "to get their secrets"[10] by means of infringing on international humanitarian law. The reproach

---

10   U.S. President George W. Bush in a statement to the Senate concerning the so called "War on Terror Legislation", Available at: >www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2006/09/20060921-3.html<, 17.07.2007.

put forward by the G-77 concerning the successive shattering of sovereignty however does not hold: The Commission clarifies its stance on the usefulness and necessity to preserve the principle of non-intervention in order to safeguard human lives and autonomous national self-realization, setting therefore high standards for the case of coercive military interventions labelled as "extreme and exceptional" (ICISS 2001: 31). It is questionable whether the G-77 would not be better off to contribute actively to clear rules in the face of mounting consensus and willingness of EU, NATO and other states to enforce militarily the ending of gross atrocities. The protection and promotion of human rights is one of the corner stones of Western identity, being deeply rooted in the liberal legacy of European and American history (Monten 2005: 119-128)[11]. The reproach of a Western attempt to impose its norms on a global scale may be admissible, which can however not be equated with the Realist statement that these ethical values derive from a dominant power position. They have rather to be understood as a part of the prevailing self-image of western states influencing their definition of interest. "This is why we commit ourselves to democracy, development, global public health, and human rights, as well as to the prerequisite of a solid structure for global peace. These are not high-sounding decorations for our interests. They are our interests, the purposes our power serves" (Powell 2004). The same point can be stated even more strongly for the European Union defining itself as a multilateral power assigning a supreme role to humanitarian considerations and development (European Council 2003). A point in case is the EU's "New Neighbourhood Policy", as Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Walner notes: "As countries strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights; and promote market-oriented economic reforms, we offer a share in the EU's single market" (Ferrero-Waldner 2006).

The breakdown of the Soviet Union meant not only a victory in brute military or economic terms, but also a revolutionary change of the international order evoking new expectations among domestic and transnational groups for a victory of democracy, human rights, capitalism or even "the end of history" (Fukuyama 1993). These new expectations increasingly found their way in the definition of secu-

---

11   „We look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression--everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way--everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want . . . everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear . . . anywhere in the world" (Roosevelt 1941). Further compare President Wilson's 14 points as well as Lincoln's Federalist Papers.

rity (High-level Panel 2004) and national interests[12]. Triggered by these radical changes "(…) the emerging multi-centric international system and a global wave of democratization have enabled human rights groups to mobilize liberal states and international organizations to incorporate the promotion of human rights into their agenda" (Kardas 2005). Even the Eastern enlargement of the European Union refers directly to the objective to promote peace, economic progress, stability and human rights.

The reproach of concealed power politics is at least arguable given the practise of western states concerning human rights during the Cold War, indicating their quality as a principled idea[13] constituting identity. It is remarkable that the human rights policies of the USA as well as those European allies were principally directed against members of their own political camp, while not so extensively focussing against the enemy on the other side of the iron curtain: redeemed by the disillusioning experience of the Vietnam War, the détente in world politics, and the entry of a fresh generation of congressmen, the United States altered their policy considerable through the incorporation and institutionalization of human rights in their foreign policy conduct with regard to the human rights issue. The Carter administration created a new State Department Bureau presided by an assistant Secretary of State for human rights and humanitarian affairs being entrusted with the preparation of an annual report on the human rights situation in countries receiving U.S. assistance. Besides this institutional innovation, Congress enacted stringent human rights legislation, thereby implementing legislative obligations on U.S. military and economic aid (Sikkink 1993: 151f.). These factual pressures translated into an amelioration of the human rights situation in Latin American states, on which these new provisions were concentrated. While the United States developed a foremost bilateral human rights policy, the West-European states clung to a more multilateral approach directed at the members of the European Convention of Human Rights. Just as Washington, the European states tracked their sight on the human rights situation in their proper political camp. This point is clearly exemplified by the case of the coup d'état in Greece in 1967, which was filed as a joint case by the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands against the military government in Athens. The result was the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe in order to avoid

---

12 In fact, there is at present no official document on international security issues of a Western state not proclaiming human rights and democracy as a significant interest.

13 For a typology of ideas see Goldstein/ Keohane (1993: 8ff.).

expulsion (Ibid., p. 149f.). The striking point is that, contrary to Realist predictions, the measures taken by the U.S. and European Countries risked to weaken their own camp vis-à-vis the Soviet block and were for this reason counterproductive, at least in a Realist fashion. The recalibration of U.S. foreign policy under the Reagan administration concentrating on an approach more aligned with *realpolitik* indicates however the fluctuating and dynamic nature of national interest concepts, albeit it has to be underlined that a political roll-back was out of reach given the high degree of assent to humanitarian objectives (Jacoby 1986: 1071f.). The issue had irresistibly found its way into the foreign policy of the United States.

In order to connect the Responsibility to Protect, it is thus dubious to reduce humanitarian objectives to an epiphenomenon, this way neglecting them a constitutive role for the definition of national interest. In congruence with the Classical Realist argument, the fall of the Soviet Union can be seen as the trigger event resulting in a push in favour of human rights. Despite the Realist assumption, this push at the expense of sovereignty is in a Constructivist perspective not seen as a form of concealed power politics. Rather, the end of Cold War opened a window of opportunity to push for a more thoroughly realization of human rights everywhere on the planet, even at costs of a corrosion of the existing sovereignty norm. Understanding universal human rights as a constant pillar of identity for modern liberal western societies as argued above helps to explain why mass-atrocities and ethnic cleansings are regarded as unacceptable mind-shocking events. Lloyd Axworthy articulated this in reference to the Kosovo intervention of NATO in 1999, stating: "Nothing has reinforced public support for Canada's policy in Kosovo more than the anguished faces of refugees flowing across Kosovo's borders. The citizens of the countries around this table are largely unaffected by these threats, but human security stands for the values they share" (Axworthy 1999). The occurrence of large-scale atrocities constitutes a direct infraction of the moral self-image of western societies crying for action, even though the non-intervention norm suffers from intervention. To react appropriately in order to safeguard human lives can thus be explained to be in "perfect resonance with the (…) demands of western populations in pursuing an ethically responsible, issue-based foreign policy (…)" (Werthes/ Bosold 2006: 27). This, one should notice is not contradictory to the remark that there are cases like Halabja 1988, Rwanda 1994, Srebrenica 1995, or more recently Darfur which lacked an appropriate reaction by western countries. Despite the neglect, ignorance or lack of political will of the West to stop grave human rights violations early enough, there has developed an honest "never again" mentality which translates steadily

into an institutionalization of prevention[14]. It is in this context that the European Union proclaimed in 2001 at the European Council in Göteborg that "in line with the fundamental values of the EU, the highest political priority will be given to improving the effectiveness and coherence of its external action in the field of conflict prevention, thereby also enhancing the preventive capabilities of the international community at large" (The Swedish Presidency 2001).

The ordinary form of sovereignty defended by the G-77 has become incongruent with western normative ideas about responsibilities and limits of state action in the domestic arena[15]. The Europeans are, due to their socialisation since the end of World War II, deeply committed to the guarantee and enforcement of human rights and have internalized this idea in their conception of interest, increasingly reflecting this to their international environment[16]. For example, the discussion on the pros and cons of an admission of Turkey to the European Union mirrors extensively the humanitarian dimension of such a step. In any case, decades of experiences of an increasingly penetrated and shared sovereignty through European integration socialized Europe in a way to support full-heartedly a redefinition of sovereignty. Just as Europe, the United States have been engaging actively for decades in the promotion of human rights, even though the so called War on Terror relativises and superimposes these efforts.[17] The Responsibility to Protect is in this perspective a materialization of western norms taking account of the new situation after the end of Cold War. These norms have been an important part of the western liberal democratic identity since long time regardless of the world political situation and irreducible to simple power political considerations. They came to be salient at a time when the post Cold War order was still not determined and imposed themselves, with the aid of a broad lobby of NGOs and intellectuals, as an increasingly important guideline for policy. In this sense, the articulated interest in the promotion of human rights at the cost of an erosion of the clas-

---

14 The EU for example introduced a "Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit" at the disposal of the High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and the Rapid Reaction Mechanism vested with €30 Million in 2005.

15 Note that there is also the argument that western governments are, at least in part, responsible for this situation due to their colonial history and the economic dependency of those countries, cf. Nuscheler (2005).

16 Compare on this point the New Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union with regard to human rights aspects.

17 The detention of terror suspects in Guantanamo as well as the applied methods of interrogation are at least barely consistent with international humanitarian law which therefore casts a shadow on the commitment of Washington to promote the spread of human rights globally.

sical doctrine of sovereignty stems from a liberal normative predisposition becoming powerful and realizable, not the other way around as Realists assume.

3. The Responsibility to Protect Between Concealed Power Politics and Principled Policy

Humanitarian objectives play an increasing role in the public discourse of politicians and media, which has even lead social scientists to identify a so called CNN effect influencing the public agenda profoundly. The mobilization of political support and financial aid in cases of human suffering brought to the attention of a wider international public indicates an increasing attachment to the needs and fears of people around the world. It has become a commonplace to assume that economic globalisation and liberal-democratic hegemony are contributing to or even causing the growing extent of interdependence throughout the world, thereby cumulatively reducing the importance of the factors time and space for social interaction. It is for this that classical concepts of security are increasingly queried with the aim to broaden the focus and analysis of the issue. Kofi Annan got this situation to the point stating that "today, no walls can separate humanitarian or human rights crises in one part of the world from national security crises in the other."[18] In fact, the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the communist military and ideological counterpart to liberal democracy have greatly picked up the pace in favour of human rights. It is in this new global political context that the gap between expectations in a new human world order and the mind-shocking humanitarian catastrophes at the beginning of the 90s have provoked a controversy concerning the limits of sovereignty as well as the international community's duty to react. Furthermore, the failure of the United Nations Security Council to overcome old lines of division has spread the opinion of a need to reform the global architecture of global security governance.

The present paper has outlined that, thanks to its long engagement for the humanitarian cause and its implementation of Human Security as official foreign policy doctrine, Canada has took up the task to find a viable answer to the question of humanitarian interven-

---

18 Nobel Price acceptance speech of Kofi Annan in 2001.

tion and state sovereignty. The resulting report The Responsibility to Protect has elaborated and clarified a more comprehensive notion of sovereignty, which stresses the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens from harm. Given that a state is not able or not willing to provide for the security of its people, the international community is allowed to react under certain conditions. Such an interference in the domestic affairs of another state has to meet high criteria of legitimacy, adequacy, proportionality and prospect of success over the long run, therefore comprising also a responsibility to prevent and to rebuild, besides the already discussed responsibility to intervene. In this setting the Security Council plays the chief part, which can only be overridden in cases of an obvious defection on grounds of political mischief of a veto-power. Despite all efforts to avoid any possibility of voluntaristic exploitation of the rules stated by the ICISS, there is a line of division mainly between the liberal democratic sphere and the G-77. In order to account for the prevailing logic of approval and opposition to the reports proposition, the paper has outlined and discussed two theoretical approaches to the question: A Classical Realist position, drawing on E. H. Carr, identifying the support of the west and the resistance of the G-77 as a form of concealed power-politics. Furthermore a Constructivist perspective, which considers the enforcement of human rights a principled belief gaining a more salient role for the definition of national interests after the end of Cold War, thereby granting to normative ideas an independent and powerful role in the explanation of foreign policy.

In any case, it is impossible to assign one of the approaches an *a priori* superiority. The Judgement of which paradigm serves better as an explication of the logic for support and opposition of a new notion of sovereignty is contingent on the preferences of the researcher, and maybe also on his cultural and political background. Following Kuhn's explanation of normal science and paradigmatic shift, this is rather a socio-psychological question of persuading researchers than a task to consider what is right or wrong, because a paradigm "cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle" of its hermeneutical hard-core (Kuhn 1962: 94).[19] Both approaches concede an intrinsic value to the

---

19 Imre Lakatos differentiated in a quite famous article the structure of theories as consisting of a hard-core constituting the negative hermeneutic and a so called protective belt being the positive hermeneutic. While the former comprises irrefutable and non-falsifiable ontological statements of the theory uniting its epistemic community, the later consists of derived hypothesis as well as ad hoc explanations aiming to accommodate reality with the hard-core. Even though Kuhn and Lakatos had significantly different opinions concerning the underlying logic of scientific revolutions, it is exactly this irrefutable hard-core to which Kuhn refers (Lakatos 1970: 133ff).

understanding of world politics, and it lies basically with the prevailing researcher to estimate which one is more convincing. It remains still to be answered whether the Realist hegemony in International Relations Theory will be challenged by more sociologically influenced theories like that of Constructivism. In order to see further than the end of ones own epistemic nose, it is remarkable to note such a steady shift in economics translating in an incorporation of psychological and sociological, that is for our purpose ideational, variables in its research design: For his work on psychological factors in economics, Daniel Kahnemann even received the Nobel Price in 2002. In any case, to find adequate theoretical interfaces for the concept of Human Security in International Relations theory is a valuable field of research for the Human Security community, clarifying thereby the scope and precision of the concept to analyze question of security at the beginning of the 21st century.

References

Amouyel, Alexandra (2006): What is Human Security? *Human Security Journal*, 1 (April): 10-23.

Annan, Kofi (2000): *We the Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century* (Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations). New York: United Nations.

Axworthy, Lloyd (1999): *Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Cologne, Germany, June 9.* Available at: >http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/PublicationContentOnly.asp?publication_id=377168&Language=E&MODE=CONTENTONLY&Local=False<, 17.07.2007.

Axworthy, Lloyd (1997): Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership. In: *International Journal*, 52 (2): 183-196.

Andrew, Mack (2002): *Report on the Feasibility of Creating an Annual Human Security Report*. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University. Available at: >http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/FeasibilityReport.pdf<, 17.07.2007.

Angell, Norman (1940): *Why Freedom Matters*, London: Penguin Press.

Bailes, Alyson J. K. (2005): Introduction - Global security governance: a world of change and challenge. In: Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute (SIPRI): *SIPRI Yearbook 2005 Armament, Disarmament and International Security.* Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1-27.

Byers, Michael/ Chesterman, Simon (2003): Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law. In: Holzgrefe, J. L. / Keohane, Robert O. (eds.): *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 177-203.

Carr, Edward Hallett (2001) [1939]: *The Twenty Years Crisis*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chevallier, Eric (2005): Leçons d'après-guerre et légitimité ex-post. In: Andréani, Gilles/ Hassner, Pierre (eds.): *Justifier la guerre ? De l'humanitaire au contre-terrorisme*, Paris : Presses de Sciences Po.

Cooper, Robert (2003): *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century.* New York: Atlantic Press.

Deng, Francis M. (1995): Frontiers of Sovereignty. A Framework of Protection, Assistance, and Development for the Internally Displaced. In: *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 8 (2): 249-286.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) (2007): *Canada and Peace Operations.* Ottawa. Available at >http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menu-en.asp<, 17.07.2007.

DFAIT (1999): *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World.* Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

European Council (2003): *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.* Brussels.

Ferrero-Waldner, Benita (2006): *Remarks on Democracy Promotion*, Conference "Democracy Promotion: The European Way" organized by the European Parliament's Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Brussels, 7 December 2006,. Available at: >http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/790&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN<, 30.04.2007.

Finnemore, Martha/ Sikkink, Kathryn (1998): International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. In: *International Organization*, 52 (4): 887-917.

Fukuyama, Francis (1993): *The End of History and the Last Man.* New York: Harper.

Gelb, Leslie H./ Rosenthal, Justine A. (2003): The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy. In: *Foreign Affairs*, 82 (3): 2-7.

Girault, Rene/ Frank, Robert/ Thobie, Jacques (2005): *La loi des géants, 1941 – 1964.* Paris: Payot.

Goldstein, Judith/ Keohane, Robert O. (1993): Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework. Goldstein, Judith / Keohane, Robert O. (eds.):

Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 3-30.

Granatstein, J. L. (1992): Peacekeeping: Did Canada make a difference? And what Difference make Peacekeeping for Canada? In: English, John/ Hilmer, Norman (eds.): *Making A Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*. Toronto: Lester: 222-236.

Group of 77 (2000): *Declaration of the South Summit*. Havana, Cuba, 10-14 April 2000. Available at: >http://www.g77.org/summit/ Declaration_G77Summit.htm<, 17.07.2007.

Hart, H. L. A. (1971): *The Concept of Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Human Security Network (2001) *The Human Security Network*. Available at: >www.humansecuritynetwork.org<, 17.07.2007

High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004): A more secure world: our shared responsibility. New York: United Nations.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001): *The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the Commission*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

Jacoby, Tamar (1986): The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, *Foreign Affairs*, 64 (5): 1066-1086.

Kagan, Robert (2003): *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Kant, Immanuel (1795): *Zum ewigen Frieden*, Stuttgart: Reclam.

Kardas, Saban (2005): *Human Rights Policy and International Relations: Realist Foundations Reconsidered*, Paper prepared for the 2005 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association-West, September 30-October 1, Las Vegas, Nevada.

Krauthammer, C. (1991): The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, 70 (1): 23-33.

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962): *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakatos, Imre (1970): Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. In: Lakatos, Imre/ Musgrave, Alan (eds.): *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 91-196.

Lowe, Steven Wallace (2000): *Peacekeeping, Peace building, Human Security, and Self-Interest: Why Canada Remains the Prolific Peacekeeper*, Paper presented at the Third Annual Graduate Student Symposium of the Conference of Defence Associations, 3-4 November, Ottawa.

Millar, Kathryn (2006): A Human Security Analysis of the War in Iraq. In: *Human Security Journal*, 2 (June): 47-63.

Monten, Jonathan (2005): The Roots of the Bush Doctrine. Power, National-
ism and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy. In: *International Secu-
rity*, 29 (4): 112-156.

Nuscheler, Franz (2005): *Entwicklungspolitik*. Bonn: Dietz.

Powell, Colin L. (2004): A Strategy of Partnership. In: *Foreign Affairs*, 83 (1):
22-34.

Rawls, John (1979): *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.

Rice, Condoleeza (2000): Promoting the National Interest. In: *Foreign Affairs*,
79 (1): 45-62.

Risse, Thomas (2002): U.S. Power in a Liberal Security Community. In:
Ikenberry, G. John (ed.): *America Unrivaled*, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press: 260-283.

Roberts, Adam (2005): Pourquoi et comment intervenir? Jus ad bellum et
Jus in Bello dans le nouveau contexte. In: Andréani, Gilles/ Hassner,
Pierre (eds.): *Justifier la guerre ? De l'humanitaire au contre-terrorisme*,
Paris : Presses de Sciences Po: 43-68.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. (1941): *Message to Congress, January 6, 1941* (The
'Four Freedoms' Speech), Available at:
>http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html<

Schütte, Robert/ Fordelone, Talita Yamashiro (2006): Human Security: A
Paradigm Contradicting the National Interest? In: *Carta Internacional*,
1 (2): 35-40.

Sikkink, Kathryn (1993): The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Po-
licies in the United States and Western Europe. In: Goldstein, Judith /
Keohane, Robert O. (eds.): *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions,
and Political Change*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 139-170.

Stourzh, Gerald (1970): *Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Gov-
ernment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Suhrke, Astri (1999): Human Security and the Interests of States. In: *Security
Dialogue*, 30 (3): 265-276.

The Swedish Presidency (2001): *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent
Conflicts*. Stockholm. Available at: >www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/
violent.pdf<, 17.07.2007.

United Nations Development Programme (1994): *Human Development Re-
port 1994 – New Dimensions of Human Security*. NewYork: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.

Walt, Stephen M. (2002): Keeping the World 'Off-balance'. Self-Restraint
and U.S. Foreign Policy. In: Ikenberry, G. John (ed.): *America Unri-
valed*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 121-154.

Wendt, Alexander (1999): *Social Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Werthes, Sascha/Bosold, David (2006): Caught between Pretensions and Substantiveness Human Security as a Political Leitmotif. In: Debiel, Thomas/ Werthes, Sascha (eds.): *Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas, Changes, Concepts and Cases*, INEF Report, 80/2006, University of Duisburg-Essen: 21-38.

Williams, Paul D./ Bellamy, Alex J. (2005): The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur. In: *Security Dialogue*, 36 (1): 27-47.

The Working Group on Human Security
at the University of Marburg

The Working Group on Human Security was founded by PhD-students at the University of Marburg in 2003. The Working Group, based on an interdisciplinary approach, is concerned with

- o various topics in the area of security,
- o the relation between development, human rights, peace, and human security in developing countries,
- o global interdependencies between economy, the environment, and security,
- o the nexus of human security and human rights,
- o human security as a political leitmotif.

The Working Group on Human Security intends to

- o foster and contribute to the international dialogue concerning human security on a national, European and global level,
- o providing impulses and possibilities for young academics and to gain practical knowledge and theoretical insights in the field of security politics, and
- o to provide them with possibilities to acquire first experiences in academic work.

The Working Group on Human Security, in cooperation with national and international partners, conducts smaller research programmes and systematically explores available international expertise in various areas of research, especially international relations, peace & conflict studies and international security studies. The Working Group on Human Security forms part of a viable international research network.

Coordinators and Speakers of the Working Group on Human Security

Dipl. Soz.-Wiss. Sascha Werthes
Dipl. Pol. David Bosold
Dipl. Pol. Jan Germann

Managing Editors of the Occasional Paper Series

Dipl. Pol. Frank Stengel   Dipl. Pol. Jan Germann
Dipl. Pol. David Bosold   Dipl. Soz.-Wiss. Sascha Werthes

The AG HumSec Occasional Paper Series

The Occasional Paper Series is published aperiodically. It publishes findings from the Working Group's ongoing research projects as well as studies on academic and policy debates which provide an overview of current global issues. Furthermore, it explicitly tries to offer young and innovative scholars to publish their research results. Articles submitted will enter an anonymous review process.

AG Human Security

The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published in 2001 proclaiming a Responsibility to Protect got anew going the controversy on humanitarian intervention. The present papers objective is two-fold: First, to shed light on the background of the controversy revolving around sovereignty and intervention articulated by the ICISS. Second, the paper's aim is to analyse the logic of support and opposition to the Responsibility to Protect with the help of International Relations Theory. Therefore, the paper will explain the instigating role of Canada in this discussion and give account to the striking points of the ICISS recommendations. Hereafter, the paper addresses the underlying logic of support and opposition by dint of two paradigms in International Relations Theory: A Classical Realist argumentation concerned with power and power relations in the post Cold War international system, and a Constructivist perspective referring to norms, identities and socialization as explanatory independent variable.